CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-DEATH

PENALTY-A

CONVICTED

CRIMINAL MUST BE ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED THAT THE DEATH
PENALTY MAY BE IMPOSED As A SENTENcE-Lankford v. Idaho,

111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991).
A convicted defendant was not always entitled to many of the
same due process rights' at the sentencing stage that the constitution guaranteed at trial. Indeed, a defendant was afforded
only limited due process protection at the sentencing stage because there were fewer constitutional interests to protect.3 The
Supreme Court's policy of attempting to rehabilitate the conI The due process owed a convicted criminal derives from the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life.., without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Although not exhaustive, due process rights afforded at sentencing include "the right to challenge evidence, the right to counsel, and the right to
exclude unreliable information." Robert E. Hanlon, Note, Hard Time Lightly Given:
The Standardof Persuasionat Sentencing, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 465, 466 (1988). See also
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) ("the truth-seeking function of trials
requires us also to recognize the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to
comment on facts which may influence the sentencing decision"); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972) (it is a denial of due process for a judge to consider prior convictions that were later held to be unconstitutional when sentencing
defendant); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (counsel must be afforded at
the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure list the specific procedural rights afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.

2 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949). See also infra notes 30-40
and accompanying text. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361,
1441 (1975) (procedural reform will soon accelerate in sentencing due process);
Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1, 6 (1968) (the legislature has failed in its duty to impose
sentencing procedures); James C. Weissman, Sentencing Due Process:Evolving Constitutional Principles, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 523 (1982) ("Until the past decade's
scrutiny of capital punishment, sentencing due process received minimal attention.
No systematic analysis of sentencing due process exists despite significant contributions from scholars in this area."); Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note, Fairness to the End:
The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1345, 1351 (1989) ("a capital offender had no constitutional due process right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses during a sentencing proceeding"); Note, Right of CriminalOffenders to Challenge Reports Used in Determining Sentence,
49 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1949);James E. Bums, Recent Decision, 13 U. DET. L.J. 87

(1950); Vernon G. Foster, Note, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (1949); Aaron Katz, Recent
Case, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 232 (1950).
3 See Margaret C. Jenkins, Comment, Intent After Enmund v. Florida: Not Just
Another Aggravating Circumstance, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 809, 819 (1985) ("From a constitutional prospective, the defendant is entitled to fewer due process protections at
sentencing because generally there are fewer constitutionally protected interests at
that stage. Due process protections are required in adversarial proceedings to protect the criminal defendants' fundamental interests.").

974

NOTE

975

victed defendant with an individually tailored sentence also required the trial judge to exercise broad discretion and obtain all
available information so an appropriate sentence could be imposed.4 The Court, however, recognizing the importance of the
sentencing process and the impact it had on defendant's liberty
interests, began extending certain guaranteed trial rights to the
sentencing process.5 The Court realized that expanding due
process protections at sentencing provided necessary safeguards
and ensured fairness. 6 More significantly, the Court enhanced
the complex of rights afforded a convicted defendant in a capital7
sentence hearing due to the death penalty's finality and severity.
Most recently, in Lankford v. Idaho,8 the Court furthered the process due by mandating that a convicted defendant in a capital
sentencing hearing be adequately notified that the death penalty
may be imposed as a sentence. 9
In Lankford, the Idaho prosecutor charged Bryan Lankford
and his brother Mark with two counts of murder.'0 The brothers
allegedly beat to death Robert and Cheryl Bravence, two travellers who were staying at a campsite." At Bryan Lankford's arraignment, the trial judge stated that Bryan Lankford could be
4 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense
in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender."). But see Gardner, 430 U.S. at 360 ("Indeed,
the extinction of all possibility of rehabilitation is one of the aspects of the death
sentence that makes it different in kind from any other sentence a State may legitimately impose.").
5 See Hanlon, supra note 1, at 465 ("The sentencing process has as much of an
impact on the liberty interests of the accused as the determination of guilt or innocence, and consequently the judiciary has recognized that due process protections
must be extended to sentencing to provide appropriate safeguards and to ensure
fairness.").
6 Id.
7 See Jenkins, supra note 3, at 820 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has recognized that
due to the special nature of the death sentence, certain protections . . . should be
provided in capital cases."); Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 ("the sentencing process, as
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause").
8 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991).
9 Id.

10 State v. Lankford, 747 P.2d 710, 713 (Idaho 1987).
11 Id. at 713. The state alleged and later proved that petitioner and his brother
Mark entered the Bravences' campsite intending to steal their Volkswagen van. Id.
Bryan Lankford first entered the campsite with a shotgun and began conversing
with the Bravences. Id. When Cheryl left the campsite, Mark Lankford entered and
ordered Robert Bravence to kneel on the ground. Id. Mark then took a nightstick
and beat Robert to death. Id. When Cheryl came back to the site, Mark ordered her
to kneel and beat her to death in the same manner. Id. The Bravences were battered "with such force that their skulls had to be reconstructed by an anthropologist before the cause of death could be scientifically determined." Id. After killing

976

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:974

sentenced to death or life imprisonment if found guilty on either
charge.' 2 Subsequently, Bryan Lankford was tried and found
guilty by a jury on both murder counts.' 3
Prior to the sentencing hearing, at petitioner's request, the
trial judge ordered the prosecutor to give written notice to both
Lankford and the court as to whether the state would seek the
death penalty.' 4 One week later, the state explicitly responded
the Bravences, the brothers placed the bodies in the van, drove into the woods, and
buried the Bravences under debris and branches. Id.
12 Id. at 719.
13 Id. at 713. Bryan Lankford's counsel attempted to negotiate a lesser sentence
by proving to the prosecutor that petitioner was not responsible for the actual killings. Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1725. Thus, Lankford took two lie-detector tests that,
although-not conclusive, convinced the prosecutor that Lankford's brother Mark
was primarily responsible for killing both Robert and Cheryl Bravence. Id. (citation
omitted). In fact, the prosecutor and the petitioner agreed that Bryan would plead
guilty to murder in exchange for the trial judge's promise to impose "an indeterminate sentence with a 10-year minimum." Id. The agreement failed, however, because "the trial judge refused to make that commitment." Id. At trial, petitioner
Lankford argued that he was "an accessory after the fact." Lankford, 747 P.2d at
714. Also, Lankford testified that he was dominated by his brother Mark, who was
dangerous and violent, and that he thought his brother simply intended to knock
the Bravences unconscious. Id. Moreover, Lankford testified that he did not point
the shotgun at the Bravences and after they were murdered, he was hysterical and
stayed in the van while Mark buried the Bravences in the woods. Id.
14 Lankford, 747 P.2d at 719. On September 6, 1984, the trial judge entered the
following presentencing order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Sentencing is set for October 12, 1984 at 9 a.m.;
(2) That on or before September 24, 1984 the State shall notify the
Court and the Defendant in writing as to whether or not the State
will be seeking and recommending that the death penalty be imposed herein. Such notification shall be filed in the same manner
as if it were a formal pleading;
(3) That in the event the State shall seek and recommend to the
Court that the death penalty be imposed herein the following
shall be filed with the Court on or before September 24, 1984:
(a) The State shall formally file with the Court and serve upon
counsel for the Defendant a statement listing the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in Idaho Code § 19-2515(f) that it
intends to rely upon and prove at the sentencing hearing to
justify the imposition of the death penalty;
(b) The Defendant shall specify in a concise manner all mitigating
factors which he intends to rely upon at the time of the sentencing hearing.
Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1726 n.5 (citation omitted). The court also granted Lankford's pro se motion for a new lawyer but denied the new attorney's request for a
trial transcript. Id. at 1726. The trial judge explained that Lankford's new attorney
had the necessary information to prepare adequately for the sentencing hearing
based upon "the preliminary hearings, the trial tapes, and the option of consulting
with former defense counsel." Id. at 1726 n.6 (citation omitted).
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that it would not pursue the death penalty sentence.' 5 Moreover,
from the time the state responded in the negative until the sentencing hearing, there was no mention in any of the proceedings
of sentencing Bryan Lankford to death.' 6
At petitioner's sentencing hearing, neither side addressed
the death penalty. 17 In fact, the prosecutor advised against the
death penalty, recommending an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of approximately ten to twenty years.' 8 Lankford's
counsel made no reference to the death penalty sentence but argued for concurrent, indeterminate life sentences.' The trial
judge, however, did not believe petitioner's testimony, 20 and
stated that the severity of the crime warranted a harsher penalty
than that suggested by either side. 2 ' Consequently, the trial
judge sentenced petitioner Bryan Lankford to death.22
15 Id. at 1726. The prosecutor responded that "[i]n relation to ... Bryan Stuart
Lankford, the State . . . will not be recommending the death penalty as to either
count of first degree murder for which the defendant was earlier convicted." Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
16 Id. at 1726-27.
17 Id. at 1727.
18 Id. The prosecutor did not believe that Bryan was responsible for the actual
killings. Id. at 1727 n.9. In fact, the prosecutor told the judge at the sentencing
hearing that "Bryan has traditionally been a pretty good person, except when he's
been around Mark." Id. (citation omitted).
19 Id. at 1727. In defense, Lankford's counsel brought in witnesses who testified
that Bryan Lankford was a nonviolent person, and focused upon the evidence that
suggested Bryan's brother Mark was the one who actually killed the Bravences. Id.
Defense counsel attempted to portray a further aspect of petitioner's character at a
hearing on a motion for continuance. Appellant's Brief at 9-10, Lankford v. Idaho,
111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991) (No. 88-7247). In that hearing, as an offer of proof, counsel
for the defendant informed the court that Mrs. Maurer (defendant's mother) would
testify "that Mark is violent, Mark is mean, Mark is a threat to society, Mark has
threatened to kill her on occasion, Mark has threatened her sons on occasion, that
she is afraid of Mark, that everyone in her family is afraid of Mark, that Bryan is
afraid of Mark." Id. at 10. Furthermore, petitioner's mother would testify that
that Bryan is not a dangerous person,
Bryan Lankford "was a peaceful person ....
that Bryan has never acted violently in all the time that she has known him, that
Bryan has, in fact, been very supportive of her and has been what every mother
wants for a son." Id.
20 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1727. The trial judge unequivocally stated that he did
not believe Bryan Lankford because "[h]e is a liar, and he is an admitted liar. He's
a deceitful individual." Id. at 1731 n.18 (citation omitted).
21 Id. at 1727. In light of the amount of time Lankford already served in jail, the
court pointed out that if the state's recommendation was imposed, Lankford would
be eligible for parole within ten years. Id. at 1727-28 n. 10. Indeed, the trial judge
posited that the state's recommendation, in essence, would require petitioner to
serve less than five years for each of the two murders. Id. at 1728 n.10.
22 Id. at 1728. Thejudge reasoned that petitioner and his brother were equally
culpable. Id. The trial court stated that although it was unclear how many times
either Bryan or Mark struck the victims, the evidence clearly showed that the
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Lankford's counsel sought post-conviction relief claiming
that the trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by failing to sufficiently notify petitioner that the
death penalty was still viable even though the state explicitly
stated it would not seek such a sentence. 23 In dismissing Lankford's motion, the trial court held that petitioner was adequately
notified by the Idaho Death Penalty statute 2 4 and added that
compliance with the notice requirement was unaffected by the
prosecutor's negative response.2 5
On direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Bryan
Lankford's conviction and sentence, reasoning that, in addition
to the statutory notice, petitioner was adequately notified of the
possibility of the death penalty sentence at his arraignment.2 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether petitioner's constitutional right to adequate notice
was violated. 27 In reversing the Idaho Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, 28 stated that the Fourteenth
Lankfords committed direct acts of violence against the Bravences that either one
could have prevented. Id. at 1728 n. 11.
23 Id.

24 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987). See infra notes 110 & 112 for the relevant text
of the statute.
25 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1728.
26 State v. Lankford, 747 P.2d 710, 719 (Idaho 1987). In a dissenting opinion,
however, Justice Bistline criticized the majority's affirmance of the sentence based
upon the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)
(reckless disregard for human life coupled with major participation in the felony is
sufficient to permit imposition of capital punishment) and Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (criminal culpability in determining whether to impose the death
sentence must be limited to the criminal's level of participation). Lankford, 747 P.2d
at 728 & n.3 (BistlineJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bistline
further criticized the proportionality review undertaken by the majority. Id. at 727
(Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice noted that the
evidence concerning petitioner's intent and the number of blows petitioner struck
was equivocal. Id. For other proportionality reviews by the Idaho Supreme Court,
see State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Idaho 1985) (death penalty sentence
was held to be excessive and disproportionate where it was never contended that
defendant actually killed the victim); State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152, 1159
(Idaho 1985) (death sentence was held to be excessive and disproportionate where
defendant did not commit the murder but aided and abetted in the commission of a
felony murder); State v. Fetterly, 710 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Idaho 1985) (death penalty
for convicted murderer was not excessive or disproportionate); State v. Beam, 710
P.2d 526, 534 (Idaho 1985) (death penalty was appropriate for a defendant convicted of murder and rape).
27 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1725.
28 Id. at 1724. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
Justice Souter. Id. at 1733.
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Amendment Due Process Clause was violated because Lankford
and his attorney were not adequately notified that the death penalty was still a possible sentence.29
The Court, however, has not always afforded a convicted defendant due process protection at criminal sentencing hearings.3 0
In the landmark decision of Williams v. New York, 3 ' Justice Black,
writing for the majority, held that because a judge had broad discretion in sentencing a convicted offender,32 the judge was not
prohibited from considering evidence obtained extrajudicially.33
Defendant Williams argued that his due process rights were violated because the sentencing judge, in exercising judicial discretion, relied upon evidence 34 from persons whom defendant did
Id.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
32 Id. at 246. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Id. at 242. Under
New York law, the trial court instructed the jury that if it found defendant guilty
and did not recommend life imprisonment, the court was required to sentence the
defendant to death; however, if the jury found defendant guilty and recommended
life imprisonment, the court could either follow the jury recommendation or impose the death sentence. Id. at 243. Although the jury recommended a life sentence, the trial judge exercised his discretion under the statute and sentenced
defendant to death. Id. at 244. Justice Black explained that to encourage the intelligent exercise of this discretion, the New York legislature encouraged trial judges to
consider all information pertaining to the convicted criminal. Id. at 245. The statute allowed a judge to consider this information even if gathered from outside
sources which the convicted criminal did not have an opportunity to cross-examine
or confront. Id.
33 Id. at 252. Indeed, Justice Black rejected a rigid constitutional barrier precluding a trial judge from exercising broad discretion. Id. at 251. The Court reasoned that "[w]e cannot say that the due process clause renders a sentence void
merely because a judge gets additional out-of-court information to assist him in the
exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death sentence." Id. at 252. See
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 555-56 (1980) (the Court allowed the sentencingjudge to consider the criminal's failure to cooperate with the government);
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53 (1978) (the Court permitted the judge, at
sentencing, to take into account the criminal's behavior during the trial). Cf United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972) (the Court reasoned that a sentence
based in part upon prior unconstitutional convictions violated due process of law);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (the Court reasoned that "vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial").
34 Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. For instance, the judge relied upon a pre-sentence
investigation report that "revealed many material facts concerning [defendant's]
background which though relevant to the question of punishment could not properly have been brought to the attention of the jury in its consideration of the question of guilt." Id. Moreover, the judge referred to a probation report that stated
defendant possessed "a morbid sexuality" and categorized him as a "menace to
society." Id.
29
30
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not have an opportunity to examine. 5 Justice Black maintained,
however, that the trial judge had discretion to use out-of-court
information 3 6 even though defendant did not have an opportunity to review it or to confront the witnesses who supplied the
information. 3 7 The Court stated that although a judge must exclude evidence at trial that may prejudice a defendant, 38 a judge
must have access to all available information to properly sentence
the criminal.3 9 Therefore, the Court concluded that extraneous
evidence was an important element in determining the criminal's
sentence, and as such, the evidence could be reviewed without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.4 0
The Court distinguished Williams, however, in Specht v. Patterson, 4 by recognizing that a sentencing proceeding that requires a
new finding of fact must afford a convicted criminal due process
protection.4 2 Defendant Specht was convicted of indecent liber35 Id. at 245.
36 Id. at 243. The trial judge obtained out-of-court information pursuant to N.Y.
CRIM. CODE LAw § 482, which provided in pertinent part:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall
cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted to it,
including any reports that may have been made as a result of a mental,
psychiatric (sic] or physical examination of such person, and may seek
any information that will aid the court in determining the proper
treatment of such defendant.
Id. at 242-43 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. CODE § 482 (McKinney 1945) (repealed)).
37 Williams, 337 U.S. at 245.
38 Id. at 246-47. See Colvin A. Peterson, Jr., Recent Decision, 48 MICH. L. REV.
523, 524 (1950) ("Rules of evidence are carefully designed to exclude the accused's
past from the jury because of the undue prejudice, unfair surprise and collateral
issues involved.").
39 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. The Court pointed out that every offense does not
merit the same punishment without regard to the person's past life and conduct. Id.
Also, the Court emphatically stated: "[tihe due process clause should not be
treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold
of trial procedure." Id. at 251.
40 Id. at 252. The Williams decision, however, signified a departure from Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), another seminal case decided one year earlier.
Weissman, supra note 2, at 525. In Townsend, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of
burglary and robbery. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 737. At his sentencing hearing, the
defendant was not represented by an attorney. Id. The sentencing judge relied
upon incorrect information to sentence the criminal. Id. at-739-40. The Supreme
Court held that the prisoner was "sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused
by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand." Id. at 741. For a discussion on the seemingly conflicting
decisions of Williams and Townsend, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1420 (describing the
two evolving lines of authority in Williams and Townsend as "schizophrenic").
41 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
42 Id. at 608-10 (citing Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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ties under a state statute that carried a maximum ten year sentence.43 The trial court, however, sentenced defendant under
the Sex Offenders Act,4 4 which required a new finding of fact and
imposed an indeterminate term, without affording defendant notice and a full hearing.4 5 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a criminal could not be convicted under one statute and
sentenced under another without receiving a full judicial hearing
prior to imposing a magnified sentence.46 Indeed, the Court
clearly stated that a defendant in such a situation was entitled to
the full panoply of pertinent safeguards that the Due Process
Clause guarantees.47
In continuing to expand convicted defendants' rights, the
Court, in Mempa v. Rhay,4 8 unequivocally stated that due process
protections extended to any criminal proceeding that substantially affected the rights of an accused.4 9 Justice Marshall, writing
Id. at 607 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-32 (West 1963)).
§§ 39-19-1 to -19-10 (West 1963)). The
Court stated that a convicted offender may be punished under § 2 of the Sex Offenders Act if the trial court "is of the opinion that any ... person [convicted of
specified sex offenses (i.e., indecent liberties)], if at large, constitutes a threat of
bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill."
Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (West 1963)).
45 Id. at 608. Once a trial judge determined a convicted sex offender constituted
"a threat of bodily harm to members of the public," and thus was within the ambit
of § 1 of the Sex Offenders Act, the judge could sentence a defendant for an indeterminate term ranging from a day to life based upon the conditions outlined in § 2
of the statute. Id. at 607-08 (quoting COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (West 1963)).
Section 2 required the following:
(2) A complete psychiatric examination shall have been made of him
by the psychiatrists of the Colorado psychopathic hospital or by
psychiatrists designated by the district court; and
(3) A complete written report thereof submitted to the district court.
Such report shall contain all facts and findings, together with recommendations as to whether or not the person is treatable under
the provisions of this article; whether or not the person should be
committed to the Colorado state hospital or to the state home and
training schools as mentally ill or mentally deficient. Such report
shall also contain the psychiatrist's opinion as to whether or not
the person could be adequately supervised on probation.
COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-2 (West 1963).
46 Specht, 386 U.S. at 609-10 (quoting Gerchman, 355 F.2d at 312).
47 Id. The Court expostulated that "[d]ue process ... requires that [defendant]
be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his
own." Id. at 610.
48 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
49 Id. at 134. The Court in Mempa relied upon the landmark decision of Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held that an indigent defendant has a
fundamental right to counsel in felony cases. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. Prior to
Gideon, however, the right of counsel at criminal proceedings was a nebulous con43

44 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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for the Court, declared that a defendant was entitled to representation at each phase of a criminal proceeding.5" Moreover, the
Justice stressed that sentencing was a "critical stage" at which
defendant's rights can be substantially affected. 5 Consequently,
the Court stated that it was improper for the trial court to impose
a ten year sentence after revoking defendant's parole without affording him an attorney. 52 Justice Marshall reasoned that an atcept that depended on special circumstances. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948).
In Hamilton, the Court held that the absence of counsel at arraignment denied
defendant due process of law. Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55. The Court stated that the
arraignment "is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 54. "What happens
there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be as irretrievably lost, if
not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel
waives a right for strategic purposes." Id. The Court in Moore stated that it was a
denial of due process when defendant did not intelligently and knowingly waive his
right to counsel before entering a guilty plea. Moore, 355 U.S. at 164-65. The Court
declared that "[t]he right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during
the trial on the merits." Id. at 160. In Townsend, the Court posited that the absence
of counsel at sentencing, where defendant pled guilty, deprived defendant of due
process. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740-41. The Court further opined that "counsel
might not have changed the sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that the
conviction and sentence were not predicated on misinformation or misreading of
court records, a requirement of fair play which absence of counsel withheld from
this prisoner." Id. at 741.
Relying upon the aforementioned cases, the Mempa Court declared that
although the Court in Gideon did not enunciate the specific criminal proceedings
where counsel must be present, Townsend, Moore, and Hamilton "clearly stand for the
proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage
of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected." Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134. More specifically, the Court in Mempa pointed out
that Townsend "illustrates the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case and
might well be considered to support by itself a holding that the right to counsel
applies at sentencing." Id. at 134. For a further discussion of the right to counsel at
the sentencing stage, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert - Counsel in
the Peno-CorrectionalProcess, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 806-12 (1961).
50 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134. See supra notes 40, 49 (discussion of Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)); Recent Case, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 883, 885 (1968)
("denial of counsel worked a denial of due process to the defendant. Examples of
such circumstances were not limited to a trial on the merits but included such collateral proceedings as pleading during arraignment, a hearing to determine the degree of crime to which a guilty plea had been entered and sentencing after a plea of
guilty"). For a discussion of Mempa's impact on probation and parole revocations,
see April Kestell, Comment, Discretionary Revocation of Probationand Parole: The Import
of Mempa v. Rhay to the Present System, 4 U.S.F. L. Rev. 160 (1969).
51 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
52 Id. at 137. Petitioner Mempa was convicted for "joyriding." Id. at 130. Petitioner pleaded guilty and the judge sentenced him to two years probation on the
condition that he first serve thirty days in jail. Id. About four months after the
sentencing, the prosecutor sought to have petitioner's probation revoked because
he was involved in a burglary. Id. at 130-31.
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torney should have been appointed to assist the convicted
offender in gathering facts, presenting proof of mitigating circumstances, and to generally aid defendant in the presentation of
his case. 5" Most importantly, however, the Court emphasized
that an attorney should have been present at sentencing to ensure that the court imposed the proper sentence and that defendant exercised all available legal rights.54
Five years after Mempa, the Supreme Court, in Morrissey v.
Brewer,5 5 expanded due process protection beyond criminal proceedings by prescribing minimum procedural safeguards at parole revocation hearings.56 At the request of Morrissey's parole
officer, petitioner's parole was revoked and he was incarcerated. 57 Petitioner claimed that he was unjustly imprisoned because he was denied a hearing prior to his parole revocation. 58
Although the Court did not vest the full panoply of protections
afforded a defendant in a criminal proceeding, 9 the Court held
that the parolee had a liberty interest that included many integral
values of unqualified liberty. 6° Thus, even though the parolee
was convicted and sentenced properly, the Court asserted that
due process entitled petitioner to a preliminary hearing and an
6
opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation of his parole. '
53 Id. at 135.
54 Id. at 135-36. The Court pointed out that under Washington law, certain

rights may be waived if not exercised. Id. For instance, in the case at bar, state law
precluded appeal where a defendant pleaded guilty and received probation, unless
probation was later revoked and a sentence was imposed. Id.
55 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
56 Id. at 488-90. See Mark S. Drucker, Case Comment, Morrissey v. Brewer: A
Parolee's Bill of Rights?, 8 NEw ENG. L. REV. 86 (1972).

57 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472-73. Originally, petitioner was convicted in 1967 for
issuing false checks and was sentenced to serve no more than seven years in prison.
Id. at 472. In 1968, petitioner was paroled. Id. Only seven months later, he was
arrested for allegedly violating the terms of his parole by purchasing a car under
another name, driving it without permission, giving fictitious statements to the police regarding his address and insurance carrier after a minor accident, acquiring
credit under another name, and failing to notify his parole officer of his residence.
Id. at 472-73.
58 Id. at 473.
59 Id. at 480.
60 Id. at 482.

61 Id. at 485-89. The Court prescribed the required minimum procedural safeguards at parole revocation hearings:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional
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In the same year that Morrissey was decided, the Supreme
Court, in the seminal case of Furman v. Georgia,6 2 examined the
constitutionality of state death penalty statutes.63 In Furman, the
Court consolidated three separate death penalty cases and considered whether the death penalty statutes constituted cruel and
unusual punishment violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 64 In a per curiam opinion that solicited nine separate opinions, the Court held that the particular state death penalty statutes involved were unconstitutional.65 Indeed, the Court
recognized the unique and severe nature of the death penalty
sentence and stated that the punishment of death differed from
other punishments in kind, but not degree.66
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. See Recent Case, 86 HARV. L. REV. 95, 97 (1972) (discussion of the impact due process requirements will have on probation hearings).
62 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
63 Id. at 239. Id. at 240. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 240, 257, 306, 310, 314 (respectively). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed
dissenting opinions. Id. at 375, 405, 414, 465 (respectively). For a series of cases
upholding the validity of state death penalty statutes, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976). But see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (mandatory death
penalty statute, even if applicable to narrow class of capital murder offenses, is unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death
sentence is violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
64 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
65 Id. For a discussion on Furman's impact, see Victor L. Streib, Executions Under
the Post-FurmanCapital Punishment Statutes: The Halting Progression From "Let's Do It"
To "Hey, There Ain't No Point In Pulling So Tight, " 15 RUTGERS L.J. 443 (1984); Carol
S. Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 850 (1973); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After
Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1972).
66 Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan articulated that "[d]eath is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in
its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to
death in terms of physical and mintal suffering." Id. Justice Stewart declared that
"[t]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. . . . And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that "[d]eath is
irrevocable.... Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible.... [D]eath has
always been viewed as the ultimate sanction." Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Additionally, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall declared that
capital sentencing procedures must not be imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas,J., concurring); id. at 295 (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring); id. at
364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305 (1976). In Woodson, the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that a statute
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Building on Furman, the Court, in Gardnerv. Florida,67 reevaluated capital sentencing procedures. 68 Defendant Gardner was
convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife with a blunt
instrument. 69 In sentencing defendant to death, the trial judge
relied upon information contained in a presentence report 70 that
was not disclosed or made available to defendant's counsel. 7 '
The Court, in a plurality opinion, emphasized two prior constitutional developments: the recognition in Furman that the death
sentence was severe and unique, and the requirements of Mempa
that sentencing procedures must satisfy due process. 72 Therefore, the Court declared that because defendant was denied an
opportunity to refute or mitigate the undisclosed information relied upon by the trial judge, the imposed death sentence denied
defendant due process of law. 73
automatically imposing the death penalty for felony murder violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The Court reasoned that the death penalty is "qualitatively different" from an imprisonment term, regardless of how long. Id. Also,
the Court stated that because the finality of death differs from that of imprisonment, reliability is critical in the determination that the death sentence is the proper
punishment in a given case. Id. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Processfor Death:
Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1976) (discussion of the
Supreme Court's handling of capital sentencing cases); Michael G. Kohn, Note, The
Death Penalty as Presently Administered Under DiscretionarySentencing Statutes is Cruel and
Unusual, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 244 (1972).
67 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
68 Id. at 357.
69 Id. at 351. In mitigation of the offense, defendant claimed that he was on a
"drinking spree" all day and had no recollection of the murder. Id. at 352.
70 Id. at 353. The presentence report was prepared by the Florida Parole and
Probation Commission. Id. Although the actual information relied upon by the
judge in sentencing defendant to death was not disclosed, the judge's "ultimate
finding was that the felony was 'especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and that such
aggravating circumstances outweigh[] the mitigating circumstance, to-wit: none.' "
Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, emphasized the fact
that the record on appeal did not reveal what was contained in the presentence
report. Id. at 354. Justice Stevens, quoted the dissenting justices from the Florida
Supreme Court: "[w]e have no means of determining on review what role such
'confidential' information played in the trial judge's sentence, and thus I would
overturn [defendant's] death sentence on the basis of this fundamental error
alone." Id. (quoting Gardner v. State, 313 So.2d 675, 678 (Fla. 1975)).
71 Id. at 351.
72 Id. at 357-58. See Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978) ("fundamental
principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty phase of a
trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal
trial"). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968) ("Whatever else
might be said of capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with the Constitution.").
73 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362. See generally John W. Hazard, Jr., Note, Pre-Sentence
Reports in CapitalSentencing Procedures, 5 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 175 (1978); Risa Lieberwitz, Case Comment, Expanding Disclosure of Presentence Investigation Reports, 29 U.
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Against the backdrop of evolving due process protection afforded a convicted offender, and in light of the heightened procedure required in capital cases, the Supreme Court, in Lankford
v. Idaho,7 " entitled convicted defendants to another due process
right at capital sentencing hearings. 75 Specifically, Justice Stevens asserted that a capital sentencing proceeding was fair only
when the court provided a convicted murderer with adequate notice that the death sentence might be imposed.76
Justice Stevens, although recognizing the trial judge's power
to impose a sentence different from the one recommended by the
prosecutor, rejected the state's argument that the plain language
of the statute and the trial judge's statements at petitioner's arraignment satisfied the notice requirement of the Due Process
Clause. 77 The Justice reasoned that because there was no mention of the death sentence between the time the state indicated it
would not pursue a capital sentence and the end of the sentencing hearing when the judge made his comments, petitioner's con78
stitutional right of notice was destroyed.
Justice Stevens also maintained that the presentencing order,79 which required the prosecution to state its intention and
submit the evidence that it intended to rely upon, narrowed the
triable issues.8 0 The Court asserted that the purpose of the presentencing order was to save judges and lawyers time, as there
was no need to address matters that were not disputed. 8 ' Thus,
FLA. L. REV. 769 (1977);John A. Mouton III, Note, Disclosure of PresentenceReports in

CapitalCases, 38 LA. L. REV. 226 (1977); Case Comment, Defendant's Right to Disclosure of Presentence Investigation Reports in CapitalCases, 1977 Wash. U. L.Q. 728 (1977).
74 Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991).
75 Id. at 1733.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1729. Justice Stevens stated: "the issue is one of adequate procedure
rather than of substantive power." Id.
78 Id. The Court observed that "the character of the sentencing proceeding did
not provide the petitioner with any indication that the trial judge contemplated
death as a possible sentence.... Indeed, it is apparent that the parties assumed that
nothing more [than imprisonment] was at stake." Id. The majority dismissed the
dissent's reliance on an April 5, 1984 hearing, at which the trial judge indicated that
regardless of the prosecutor's recommendation, the death sentence still remained a
viable option. Id. at 1727 n.7. The court noted that the hearing took place before
the state entered its negative response. Id. The majority also disposed of the dissent's argument that the issuing of a presentencing order indicated that the death
penalty was still a viable choice; the Court suggested that such orders are common.
Id.
79 See supra note 14 (presentence order).
80 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1729.
81 Id. Also, the Justice declared that presentencing orders would serve no purpose if counsel could not rely upon them. Id.
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the majority asserted that petitioner's counsel justifiably assumed
arguments against the death penalty were unnecessary because
the presentence order expressly provided that the state would
not pursue a capital sentence.12 While conceding that the presentencing order should not limit counsel's preparation, the
Court stressed that
fair notice was the bedrock of a constitution83
hearing.
fair
ally
Justice Stevens provided examples of arguments that petitioner's counsel could have made had she known that the trial
judge was still contemplating sentencing Bryan Lankford to
death.8 4 The Justice suggested that Lankford's attorney could
have voiced the concern-raised by the dissenting justice in the
Idaho Supreme Court-that Bryan Lankford's state of mind was
mischaracterized and that the facts surrounding the case were
disputed. 5 The majority also reasoned that Lankford's counsel
82 Id.

83 Id. The Justice stated that democracy inherently respects the fundamental
rights of an individual, regardless of whether the individual is convicted of a heinous crime. Id. at 1730 (quotingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Justice added that a democracy must act fairly by notifying a person in danger of loss as to the case against
him. Id. (quotingJointAnti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 171-72 (FrankfurterJ.,
concurring)).
84 Id. at 1730. As it stood, Lankford's attorney advanced arguments unrelated to
the death penalty and focused on the time Bryan Lankford was going to spend in
prison. Id. at 1727. Petitioner's counsel advocated a concurrent, indeterminate life
sentence and discouraged a consecutive, indeterminate term that would have resulted in a twenty year term. Id. Lankford's counsel also argued against a fixed-life
term that would have resulted in a forty-year minimum sentence. Id. The majority
opined that if Lankford's counsel knew of the specific aggravating circumstances
that the trial judge relied upon, petitioner's attorney could have attempted to refute or mitigate those circumstances. Id. at 1730. The aggravating circumstances
that the trial judge identified for the first time at petitioner's sentencing hearing
were:

(a) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder. ...
(b) The murders of the Bravences were especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel, and manifested exceptional depravity. ...
(c) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the
defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life. ...
(d) the murders were defined as murder of the first degree by Idaho
Code § 18-4003(d) and the murders were accompanied with the
special intent to cause the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Bravence ....
(e) The defendant, by prior conduct and by the conduct in the commission of the murders at hand exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to
society.
Id. at 1730 n. 15 (citation omitted).
85 Id. at 1730-31 (citing State v. Lankford, 747 P.2d 710, 728 (Idaho 1987)
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could have argued that petitioner's level of participation did not
meet the requisite standard to sentence him to death.8 6 The
Court reiterated that petitioner's attorney made no effort to advance these matters because she believed the death penalty sentence was eliminated as a possible outcome. 7
Moreover, the majority posited that the aggravating circumstance that "the murders of the Bravences were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and manifested exceptional depravity,"
could arguably have been refuted by Lankford's counsel.8 8 The
Court reasoned that even if Lankford were the actual killer, his
attorney could have argued that the evidence did not support a
finding of such an aggravating circumstance.89 Justice Stevens
emphasized that petitioner's counsel did not make these arguments because the trial judge contemplated the death penalty silently.9 ° In addition, Justice Stevens dismissed the state's
argument that the defense had notice by declaring that it was unrealistic to believe that the notice given by the statute and the
advice given at arraignment survived the prosecutor's explicit
response. 9 '
Furthermore, the Court rationalized that petitioner's lack of
notice was demonstrated by the failure of defense counsel to submit the results of two lie-detector tests that may have shown the
truthfulness of Lankford's testimony.92 The Court expostulated
(Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). See supra note 26 (discussion of dissenting justice's opinion).
86 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1730 (1991). See supra note 28. The Court noted two
Idaho cases applying this standard: State v. Small, 690 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Idaho
1984) (given that the individuals had different backgrounds and disparate roles in
the commission of the crime, different sentences were justified); State v. McKinney,
687 P.2d 570, 576 (Idaho 1984) (different levels of participation warrant different
sentences). Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1730 n.16.
87

Id.

Id. at 1731 (citation omitted). See supra note 84 and accompanying text (aggravating circumstances relied upon by trial judge).
89 Id. Justice Stevens posited: "A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.' "Id. at 1731 n. 17 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)).
The Justice continued: "The petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a
consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder.
His victims were killed instantaneously." Id. (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (footnote omitted)).
90 Id. at 1731.
88

91 Id.
92 Id. At the time Lankford's attorney motioned for post-conviction relief, she
argued that the lie-detector tests evinced that Bryan Lankford was telling the truth
when he stated he had no knowledge of the murders and did not participate in
them. Id. (citation omitted). See supra note 13.
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that although the results of the tests were inadmissible in an ordinary sentencing hearing, they were arguably allowed in capital
sentencing proceedings. 93 Therefore, the majority concluded
that the inadequacy of notice prevented petitioner's counsel from
advancing arguments that could have influenced the trial judge
to impose a lesser sentence or at least arrive at different
findings. 94
The majority also denounced the trial judge's silence in contemplating whether to sentence petitioner to death. 95 Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of fairness in procedures
dealing with the death penalty due to the finality and severity of
the punishment.96 Moreover, the majority recognized 97 that a
trial judge cannot use undisclosed information to determine
whether a person should receive the death penalty.98 Justice Stevens, while realizing the trial court did not use secret information
to sentence petitioner Lankford to death, reasoned that the trial
judge's silence after the prosecution expressed an intention not
to pursue the death penalty effectively preventing the parties
from debating the critical issue and thus denying the parties fair
procedure. 99
93 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1731. The Court stated that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments allow the trial court at sentencing to consider any aspects of a convicted offender's record or character and any circumstances of the particular offense that the convicted criminal proffers to avoid the death sentence. Id. at 1731
n.19 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). The Court acknowledged that there is no standard procedure for determining when the death sentence should be imposed. Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605). The Court,
however, clearly emphasized that a statute cannot prohibit a sentencer from considering independent mitigating factors of the convicted criminal's character and record because it creates a risk that a person will be sentenced to death even though
mitigating circumstances call for a less stringent punishment. Id. (quoting Lockett,
438 U.S. at 605). Indeed, the Court pronounced that "when the choice is between
life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
94 Id. at 1731.
95 Id. at 1731-32.
96 Id. at 1732 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)). In Gardner,
Justice Stevens articulated the unique nature of the death penalty. Gardner,430 U.S.
at 357. Moreover, the Justice indicated that society views the taking of one's life
differently from any other government action. Id. at 357-58. Consequently, the Justice reasoned it is of the utmost importance to society that the imposition of the
death penalty "be based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Id. at 358. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text (the death penalty is qualitatively different
from life imprisonment).
97 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
98 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1732 (citing Gardner, 430 U.S. at 360).
99 Id. The Court supported this by reviewing its case law regarding notice, including Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
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The majority concluded by pointing out that the adversarial
process would cease to function if the parties were not adequately notified.'°° The Court asserted that the adversarial process played a critical role in the search for truth and fairness.''
Therefore, Justice Stevens declared, the trial judge's silent contemplation of the death sentence created an intolerable
risk be0 2
cause the adversarial process could not function.1
In a spirited dissent, Justice Scalia disagreed that Bryan
Lankford, a convicted murderer, was denied his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.10 3 Justice Scalia declared that
the majority's opinion created ambiguity in the law." °4 The Justice reasoned that not only were capital defendants no longer
presumed to know the law, they were presumed to have been
misled by an ignorance of the law. 10 5 Justice Scalia pointed out
that the Idaho Code clearly stated that a person convicted of first
degree murder shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 10 6 Furthermore, the Justice emphasized that Bryan Lank(interested parties must be notified of the pending action so they could present
their objections). Lanhford, 111 S. Ct. at 1732 n.22. Justice Stevens concluded that
"[i]n the capital context, in which the threatened loss is so severe, the need for
notice is even more pronounced." Id.
100 Id. at 1732-33. The Justice relied upon Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), which provided: "[a] capital sentencing proceeding ... is sufficiently
like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision...
that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to
ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the
standards governing decision." Lankford, 111 S.Ct. at 1733 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686-87).
101 Id. Justice Stevens based his statement on Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977), which stated: "[o]ur belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials requires us also to recognize the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to comment on facts which may influence
the sentencing decision in capital cases." Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 360). See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)
(adversarial testing will promote truth and fairness).
102 Lankford, I IS. Ct. at 1732-33. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cardenas, 917 F.2d
683, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1990) (the court reasoned that counsel must be notified and
given a meaningful opportunity to present arguments before sentencing judge
could impose punishment in excess of federal sentencing guidelines); Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (the objective of the adversarial system that
the guilty are "convicted and the innocent go free" is promoted by partisan
advocacy).
103 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id. Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the constitutional adequacy of
notice was ameliorated because petitioner was "misled" by the trial judge. Id. at
1736 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Consequently, Justice Scalia articulated that under the
majority's holding, the finality and certainty of a decision cannot be assured. Id.
106 Id. at 1733 (Scalia,J. dissenting).Justice Scalia posited: "[E]very person guilty
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ford was told directly at his arraignment that he could be
sentenced to death0 7or life imprisonment if convicted on either
charge of murder.1
Justice Scalia noted that the sentencing judge had full responsibility for determining the sentence after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.' 1 8 Moreover, the dissenting
Justice articulated that if the trial court found any aggravating
circumstance, the trial judge was required by law to sentence
Bryan Lankford to death, unless the mitigating factors surrounding the case outweighed the aggravating circumstance. 0 9 Justice
Scalia noted that if the trial court found any aggravating circumstance, but the death penalty was not ordered, the court was
mandated by statute' 'o to give its reasons, in writing, for not senof murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for
life." Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1987)).
107 Id. (citation omitted). In addition to quoting the statutory language, Justice
Scalia asserted that Idaho case law confirms that petitioner was adequately notified.
Id. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied upon State v. Rossi, 672 P.2d
249 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Lankford, 111 S.Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
Rossi, defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to an imprisonment term greater than the sentence recommended by the
prosecutor after plea negotiations. Rossi, 672 P.2d at 250. The state court held,
however, that the recommendation made by the prosecutor to the court was
"purely advisory." Id. Justice Scalia declared that although Rossi did not deal with a
death penalty issue, there is nothing in the Idaho Code that suggests capital cases
should be handled differently. Lankford, Ill S. Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Moreover, based upon State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981), Justice Scalia
summarily dismissed the argument that notice was destroyed by the state's negative
response. Lankford, 111 S.Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Osborn, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that whether the prosecution had notified defendant that it
would seek a capital sentence was irrelevant because the prosecutor's intentions
were immaterial to the adequacy of notice. Osborn, 631 P.2d at 195.
108 Lankford, 111 S.Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. Justice Scalia emphasized that IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) provides, in pertinent part: "[w]here the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court
shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust." Id. (quoting IDAHO CODE § 192515(c) (1987) (emphasis added)).
110 The relevant Idaho provision states:
Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments in mitigation and
aggravation the court shall make written findings setting forth any
statutory aggravating circumstance found. Further, the court shall set
forth in writing any mitigating factors considered and, if the court
finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance found so as to make unjust the imposition of the
death penalty, the court shall detail in writing its reasons for so
finding.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(e) (1987).
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tencing petitioner to death."' Justice Scalia also explained that
the trial judge was not dependent upon the aggravating circumstances brought forth by the prosecutor; moreover, once the evidence was admitted to the court, it did not have to be repeated to
be considered at the sentencing hearing." 2 Justice Scalia posited
that Lankford's conviction on two murder counts should have
alerted petitioner's counsel that the trial judge would find at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance." 3 Therefore, Justice
Scalia reasoned that Lankford was adequately notified because
the trial judge, as a matter of law, was required to sentence petitioner to death unless the mitigating factors presented outweighed the aggravating circumstance." 4

I I Lankford,
112 Id.

Ill S. Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

This was mandated by IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d), which stated:

In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the court
shall, after conviction, order a presentence investigation to be conducted according to such procedures as are prescribed by law and
shall thereafter convene a sentencing hearing for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense. At such hearing, the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation
and mitigation. Should any party present aggravating or mitigating
evidence which has not previously been disclosed to the opposing
party or parties, the court shall, upon request, adjourn the hearing
until the party desiring to do so has had a reasonable opportunity to
respond to such evidence. Evidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing. Evidence
offered at trial but not admitted may be repeated or amplified if necessary to complete the record.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d) (1987).
'13 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted the
statutory aggravating circumstance described in IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(2)
(1987). "At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder." Lankford, Ill S. Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515(g)(2) (1987)). See supra note 84 and accompanying text (aggravating circumstances relied on by trial judge). Justice Scalia pointed out that the
Lankfords brutally smashed the skulls of Robert and Cheryl Bravence while the
couple offered no resistance and were submissively kneeling on the ground. Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1734 n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Lankford, 747 P.2d
710, 713 (Idaho 1987)). Moreover, the dissenting justice noted that after the
Lankfords killed the Bravences, they drove the dead couple into the woods and left
their bodies under debris and branches where the bodies remained undiscovered
for three months. Id. Justice Scalia pointed out that competent counsel should
therefore have anticipated that the judge would find statutory aggravating circumstances. Id. See IDAHO CODE § 19 -2 5 15 (g)(5) (1987) (an aggravating circumstance
will be found if the killing was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity"); IDAHO CODE § 19 -2 5 15 (g)( 6 ) (1987) (an aggravating circumstance will be found if "the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human
life").
' 14 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia also rejected the majority's conclusion that the
presentencing order was comparable to a pretrial order limiting
the issues.'' 5 The Justice stated it was unreasonable to assume
that the presentencing order limited the triable issues because
the trial court neither expressly stated such limitations, nor indicated in any other way that it was limited by the prosecutor's recommendation."

6

Justice Scalia further pointed out that a

pretrial order narrowing the triable issues was usually entered
under a statute or rule that explicitly set forth the order's preclusive effect." 7 Moreover, the Justice emphasized that although a
capital sentence would be unlikely because no one would be arguing for it, the order did not preclude the judge from sentencing petitioner to death." 8
Justice Scalia continued by stating that the trial judge never
intended to be restricted at the sentencing hearing, but simply
issued the presentencing order" 9 at the request of petitioner's
counsel.120 In fact, the Justice emphasized that after ordering the
prosecution to state its intentions, the trial judge ordered a
presentence investigation and an inquiry into the statutory aggra115 Id. at 1734-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1735 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
117 Id. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e) (an order entered after a pretrial conference
shall control subsequent proceedings). TheJustice noted that if there is no specific
rule or statute, the order itself should define the preclusive effect. Lankford, 111 S.
Ct. at 1735 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the case sub judice, the presentencing order
did not explicitly narrow or limit the issues; thus, Justice Scalia declared that the
only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the order was that it required
the prosecution to simply state whether it would pursue the death penalty. Id.
118 Id.
119 See Id. at 1726 n.5 (text of order). The trial judge granted the motion for a
presentence order on September 6, 1984. Id. at 1726.
120 Id. at 1735. Justice Scalia set out the actual dialogue that took place between
Mr. Longeteig (petitioner's counsel prior to his pro se motion) and the trial judge on
April 5, 1984 to stress that the trial judge never intended to be bound:
Mr. Longeteig: I wonder could the court fix a time in which the state
would file a notice of its intention in respect to capital punishment.
This would materially, depending on what he does, alter our course of
action in this matter.
The Court: I don't know that there is any provision that the state notify.
116

Mr. Longeteig: I'm not aware of any either. I think it would be a matter
of the discretion of the court. But I would request that.
The Court: Oh, well, Mr. Albers the prosecutor apparently doesn't have
any objections to your request. He's indicated that, I think, as soon as
he knows for sure what he wants to do, he'll tell you.
Mr. Longeteig: That's satisfactory.
Id. (citation omitted).
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vating circumstances surrounding the case.t 2 ' Therefore, Justice

Scalia reasoned, the death penalty still remained an issue because
only death penalty
cases required presentence investigations and
2
inquiries.

2

Justice Scalia illustrated that Lankford's counsel remained
aware that the death penalty was a viable choice.' 23 For instance,
although the prosecutor argued for life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, petitioner's counsel argued against the
24
more severe sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
Justice Scalia rationalized that it was peculiar for petitioner's
counsel to assume that the judge could exceed the state's recommendation with regard to all sentences but the death penalty. 25
Moreover, Justice Scalia expostulated, if Lankford's counsel
truly believed that the trial judge did not intend to impose the
death sentence, Lankford's counsel would have aggressively objected when the judge stated at the end of the sentencing hearing
that the death penalty was still being contemplated. 126 Justice
Scalia reasoned that petitioner's counsel was not shocked by the
121 Id. at 1735-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia emphasized that even
though the trial judge entered the presentencing order, it was clear that he did not
intend to dismiss the death penalty when he stated: "[tihere obviously needs to be
an inquiry pursuant to § 19-2515 as to the statutory aggravating circumstances...
regardless whether or not the state intends to pursue the death penalty." Id. at
1735 (Scalia,J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
122 Id. at 1735-36 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia did not find persuasive the
majority's reasoning that notice was inadequate because the trial judge ordered the
presentence investigation and inquiry into the aggravating circumstances prior to
the state's negative response. Id. at 1736 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
countered that the judge clearly stated that the procedures for imposing the death
sentence would be followed "whether or not the state intends to pursue the death
penalty." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, although Justice
Scalia recognized that petitioner's counsel changed after the April 5 meeting, the
Justice stated that the new attorney should have inquired about the relevant information pertaining to the case. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Scalia pointed out that
the trial judge "specifically ordered Mr. Longeteig [petitioner's original counsel] to
remain in the case and be at [the new attorney's] 'beck and call.' " Id. (citation
omitted). But see supra note 78 (majority's argument).
123 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1736 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Id. See supra notes 13, 18-19 and accompanying text (discussion of sentencing
terms advocated by each side).
125 Lankford, Ill S. Ct. at 1736 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 1737 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the end of the sentencing hearing, the
trial judge "stated that the available sentences included '[flor example, a fixed term
of 40 years or death or a fixed life sentence. So there are a great number of possibilities available to this [clourt.' " Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Justice
Scalia pointed out that petitioner's counsel "was aggressive enough in objecting to
another portion of the judge's concluding statement, two pages later in the transcript, that the judge interrupted with 'Counsel, I'm not here to argue with you.'
Id. (citation omitted).
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statement because defense counsel understood that a capital sentence was still possible. 27 Finally, Justice Scalia concluded that
the majority's opinion adopted a vacuous and ambiguous principle of law because petitioner could simply argue that he reason128
ably believed the death penalty was not at issue.
In Lankford v. Idaho, the majority aptly preserved the sanctity
of the Due Process Clause by recognizing the unique nature of
the death penalty sentence.' 2 9 The majority correctly concluded
that the trial judge issued the presentencing order to limit the
triable issues at defendant's sentencing hearing. 3 0 Clearly, the
presentencing order's express language implied that defendant
did not have to argue or present mitigating factors unless the
state sought the death penalty. 3 '1 Thus, Lankford acted reasonably when he assumed that he did not have to present any mitigating factors in light of the state's negative response. Moreover,
the majority correctly adhered to the principle espoused in Gard3 2
ner v. Florida that the death sentence must be based on reason.1
The Court would have defied reasonable expectations if it held
that the presentencing order served no other purpose but to
state what sentences the prosecution intended to pursue. The
issuance of the order reasonably allowed petitioner Lankford to
127 Id. Justice Scalia also rejected the argument that because petitioner's counsel
did not raise any death penalty issues, it can be inferred that the defense counsel
detrimentally relied upon the presentencing order. Id. Justice Scalia stated "[t]hat
is not terribly persuasive evidence, since all the arguments made against a life sentence or a minimum term of more than 10 years would apply a fortiori against a
sentence of death." Id. Justice Scalia asserted several possibilities that would explain why counsel did not present any death penalty arguments at the sentencing
hearing. Id. The Justice hypothesized, for example, that petitioner's counsel may
have believed that although the death penalty was still a possible choice, it seemed
extremely unlikely that it would be imposed. Id. Furthermore, the dissent theorized
that Lankford's counsel may not have addressed the death penalty because she did
not want to attract attention to it or indicate that it was still a possible option. Id.
Moreover, Justice Scalia posited that petitioner's counsel could have simply been
negligent in her failure to address the death penalty issue. Id. Justice Scalia suggested that petitioner Lankford may have a suit against his attorney for ineffective
assistance. Id.
128 Id. Justice Scalia stated that "we seemingly adopt the topsy-turvy principle
that the capital defendant cannot be presumed to know the law, but must be presumed to have detrimentally relied upon a misunderstanding of the law or a misrepresentation of the judge." Id.
129 Id. at 1732.
130 Id. at 1729.
131 See Id. at 1732. See also note 14 (text of presentence order as issued by the trial
judge).
132 Id. at 1732 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)).
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assume that the trial judge's order superseded all other statutory
procedures pertaining to the death penalty.
The dissenting Justices failed to recognize the unique and
severe nature of the death penalty sentence as illustrated byJustice Scalia's reliance upon the non-capital case of State v. Rossi,
which held that a prosecutor's recommendation was purely advisory.1 33 Instead, Justice Scalia clearly suggested that there was
no difference between capital and non-capital cases.' 3 4 Indeed,
Justice Scalia's statement contravened the very essence of
Furman, in which the Supreme Court succinctly stated that the
death penalty differed from other types of punishment. 1 5 Also,
the statement evinced an attitude on the part of the Justices that
seemed to carelessly disregard Lankford's death sentence.
Moreover, the majority's decision does not, as the dissent
suggests, establish vast uncertainty in criminal sentencing procedure. 3 6 Instead, the majority sends an unequivocal message to
state prosecutors declaring that a convicted criminal cannot be
sentenced to death unless he is afforded the utmost in due process protection. If anything, the majority's decision requires
state sentencing procedures to adhere to strict guidelines or fail
constitutional scrutiny. Certainly, given the finality of the death
sentence, the majority's prudent approach is preferable because
it ensures that certain requirements are fulfilled before sentencing a criminal to death. The dissent's approach, on the other
hand, attempts to place the judicial burden on the criminal and
sacrifice his due process rights for the sake of certainty.
Although Idaho has a bi-furcated trial system, perhaps the
state could adopt a system that allows the jury, instead of the trial
judge, to determine the extent of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.13 7 For instance, the prosecution would have to
133 Id. at 1734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134 Id. Justice Scalia stated, "nothing in any provision of the Idaho Code or in

Idaho case law suggests that the rule in capital cases would be any different." Id.
135 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
136 Lankford, 111 S. Ct. at 1736 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Indeed, the majority of states have statutes that require a jury to impose the
death sentence. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie Supp. 1989); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -32 (Michie 1990);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. CRIM. LAw CODE ANN. § 413
(1992); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 175.554, .556 (Michie 1986) (if the jury is not
unanimous in its decision, the court may impose the death sentence); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1986 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp.
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present the jury with the actual aggravating circumstances it will
rely upon while defendant would have the obligation of presenting all available mitigating circumstances. 3 8 In this way, the tremendous decision of sentencing a criminal to death is taken out
of the judge's hands and placed with the jury.

3

9

Most impor-

tantly, there will be no need to determine whether the defendant
actually received notice of the possible sentence because the defendant could only be sentenced to death if the issues are directly
1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(f) (1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A27A-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.071 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 1990);
WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1983).
138 For instance, § 2C: 11-3(c) of the New Jersey Criminal Code provides the following procedural requirements before sentencing a convicted defendant to death:
(1) The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death ....
Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding
shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before
the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good
cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding
before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where
the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a
jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted
the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and
before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the
court may conduct a proceeding without a jury....
(2)(a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating
factors .... The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors ... but shall not have
a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (West Supp. 1991). For a historical discussion of death
sentencing in New Jersey, see Hugo A. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 19071960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1964); Thomas W. Cavanagh, Jr. and FrankJ. Zinna,
Note, The Constitutionalityand Desirability of Bifurcated Trials and Sentencing Standards, 2
SETON HALL L. REV. 427 (1971); Hon. Irwin I. Kimmelman, The Death Penalty in New
Jersey, 103 N.J. LAWYER 9 (1983).
139 Two Idaho Supreme Court justices advocate jury determinations for capital
sentences, arguing that a right to a jury in capital sentencing is found in the state
constitution. See State v. Lankford, 747 P.2d 710, 726 (Idaho 1987) (Huntley, J.,
concurring) ("Idaho's death sentence procedure, in failing to utilize the jury in the
process, violates the Idaho Constitution"); State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 478
(1983) (Huntley, J., dissenting) ("jury participation in the capital sentencing process is part of the right to 'trial by jury' as guaranteed inviolate by Art. 1, § 7 of the
Idaho Constitution"); id. at 487 (Bistline, J., dissenting) ("for over 110 years it was
the jury who made the decision of death or life").
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presented to the jury as questions of fact during the sentencing
phase of trial. The stricter procedures will crystallize the exact
nature of the debate, whereas the current Idaho system allows a
judge to whimsically employ the death sentence unbeknownst to
40
defendant.
ChristopherM. Wilson
140 In additional to Idaho, a minority of states allow the court to independently
impose the death sentence. See e.g. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989).

